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Justifying Cyber-Intelligence?  
Introduction  
Edward Forster, in his short story The Machine Stops, describes a world where almost every 
activity is aided in some way by a vast computerised system known simply as The Machine: 
µ7KH Machine feeds us and clothes us and houses us; through it we speak to one another, 
through it we see one another, in it we have our being; The Machine is omnipotent, eternal; 
blessed is The 0DFKLQH¶ (1909, p.26). )RUVWHU¶V depiction of a world where every activity is 
influenced, mediated, aided and even controlled by a massive computer system offers a 
powerful reflection on how intermingled our everyday lives have become with technology. 
Over the last two decades, the role and pervasiveness of computers and the Internet has 
exploded in ways unimagined. Communications, data, pictures, music, activities, business, 
and personal information, are all being increasingly digitised and transferred along 
information highways. The result has been the birth of the modern information nation, 
dramatically changing the way people, organisations and states carry out their everyday lives 
and activities.  
This computer revolution, however, comes with its own costs. While it offers ever 
more efficient and effective means of facilitating every day and long term needs it also offers 
the same advantages to those who seek to cause others harm. For example, criminals and 
terrorists are now able to communicate, organise and carry out their aims with greater stealth, 
reach and efficiency, while states are able to engage in cyber-espionage and attack with 
increased anonymity and deniability. The Stuxnet computer worm, for example, found in 
computers at ,UDQ¶V Natanz nuclear site landed a significant blow on any Iranian nuclear 
ambitions without anyone lifting a sword (Sanger, 2012; Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011, 
pp.24-25). Similarly, cyber-attacks on civilian structures, such as the case in Estonia in 2007, 
which brought down the websites of its banks, governmental agencies and media outlets, 
demonstrated the vulnerability of such structures as well as their increased importance in the 
modern world (BBC, 2007; Traynor 2007; Landler and Markoff, 2007; Blomfield, 2007). 
Equally important is the threat of cyber-espionage. µ7LWDQ 5DLQ¶ for example, stole data from 
1$6$¶V Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and Air Force flight planning software as well as data 
from US government systems and defence contractors (Posner, 2010; Sommer and Brown, 
2011); µ2SHUDWLRQ $XURUD¶ consisted of numerous attacks on high-tech, security and defence 
contractor companies (Cha and Nakashima, 2010); and Operation µ*KRVWQHW¶ accessed the 
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foreign affairs ministries of Iran, Indonesia, Philippines and the embassies of India, South 
Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan as well as computers at NATO headquarters 
(Information Warfare Monitor , 2009). 
The surge in both quantity and variety of cyber-threats has placed significant pressure 
on the state, and more importantly on its intelligence community, to adapt or leave itself open 
to attack. This pressure has caused many in both political and intelligence circles to argue for 
ever greater amounts information in order to catch potential threats before they become real, 
and in a world dominated by the power of the Internet this means increased access to 
cyberspace and the vast quantities of information that can be found there (Pace, 2013). By 
collecting all the digital information people create the intelligence community argues that it is 
not only able to detail what people have done or are currently doing but can also predict what 
their next move might be. The aim: to predict and prevent the next large attack. Moreover, 
this objective is an ethical one. The state and its institutions are tasked with the duty to 
protect both the individual and political community from harm. For example, Michael Walzer 
argues that the historical willingness to defend RQH¶V state is an outgrowth of the natural 
attachment to our political community; that our shared experiences and cooperative activity 
seen in the political community shape our life and is ethically valuable to us as a result. 
People both need and value the state as their main protector (2000, p.53; Anscombe, 1970, 
p.43). The intelligence community therefore plays an important role in this task by detecting, 
locating and preventing potential threats, including threats from international terrorist 
networks and sub-state actors, domestic crime and social unrest, state aggression, foreign 
espionage and international instability.  
However, the backlash from both the public and politicians that followed Edward 
6QRZGHQ¶V revelations regarding cyber-intelligence showed that such activities were not 
without controversy. Reports that the American National Security Agency (NSA) has been 
FROOHFWLQJ DQG VWRULQJ VRPH WZR ELOOLRQ µUHFRUG HYHQWV¶ SHU GD\ VLQFH  /XFDV 
p.31) were met with significant concern that the intelligence community no longer reflected 
the ethical or social principles of society (Horwitz and Branigin, 2013; Traynor, 2013). 
Indeed, for the first time in a decade Americans are concerned that government anti-terrorism 
policies have gone too far in restricting civil liberties (Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013; 
Horowitz and Branigin 2013) while in the UK senior politicians have suggested that without 
greater scrutiny the intelligence services will lose the trust of the British public (Hopkins and 
Taylor, 2013).  
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This leaves the debate stuck between the important, ethical role that intelligence can 
play and the potential for its unrestrained use to cause undue harm. This paper will resolve 
this by first giving greater detail to cyber-intelligence practices, highlighting the different 
levels of harm that the various intelligence operations can cause. However, the point of this 
paper is not that cyber-intelligence should be banned outright, but that it can be justified 
given the necessary circumstances. Therefore, the paper will develop a specialised set of Just 
Cyber-Intelligence Principles, built on the just war tradition, to outline if and when such 
activities are justified. 
 
Cyber-Intelligence: Collection and Analysis 
As a process intelligence consisWV RI D µF\FOH¶ ZKHUHE\ LQIRUPDWLRQ LV DFTXLUHG FRQYHUWHG
into its finished product and made available to policy makers. At each stage of this 
intelligence-cycle, cyberspace has increased in prominence, from using it as a means to 
collect information by monitoring online habits, to analysing large datasets, to creating 
predictive models of behaviour, as well as using cyberspace to launch attacks on other 
computerised systems, such as was the case with Stuxnet.1 As such, cyber-intelligence is an 
umbrella term that covers a range of different practices used by intelligence actors through 
the medium of cyberspace. This paper, however, will focus on collection and analysis, 
examining how the intelligence community uses cyberspace to collect communication 
content by accessing emails or voice-calls, as well as the move towards the collection and 
analysis of meta-data through data-mining and dataveillance.2 This former cyber-intelligence 
tactic of data-mining involves collecting aQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDO LQIRUPDtion from various 
data sources ± personal identity, financial accounts, medical records, fingerprints or DNA 
profiles for example ± in order to develop a personalised µdigital GRVVLHU¶ (Solove, 2004, p.1). 
,Q FRPSDULVRQ µGDWDYHLOODQFH¶ LQYROYHV PRQLWRULQJ WKH µHOHFWURQLF IRRWSULQW¶ LQHYLWDEO\ OHIW
behind when an individual interacts with a computerised system. Websites, for example, 
WUDFN D FXVWRPHU¶V ZHE-surfing secretly when he accesses it, including data about the ISP, 
computer hardware and software, the website he linked in from and exactly what parts of the 
website he explored and for how long (Solove, 2004, p.23). This data can be collected in a 
similar way to existing the communication surveillance methods, recording all individuals 
who visit a particular website, referred to here as a µserver log¶ for ease as it focuses on the 
website side of events, or a detailed list of all the websites an individual visits, referred to as 
µpersonal web logs¶ as this examines activitiHVFDUULHGRXWIRUPWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVSHFWLYH. 
Moreover, many real world actions also create digital footprints, recording time, place and 
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action. Money, travel, official documentation, shopping and all forms of communication are 
but a few examples wherHHYHQLQWKHUHDOZRUOGRQHLVOLNHO\WRKDYHRQH¶VDFWLYLWLHVORJJHG
in some computerised system. This makes avoiding having our activities recorded in our 
everyday life increasingly difficult in developed societies. 
By collecting this type of information from enough people and cross-referencing it 
into a searchable database it is possible to understand what an individual is both doing and 
intending to do and determine if this is a threat.   
 
Cyber-Harm 
The particular problem that cyber-intelligence raises is that recent developments in both 
technology and how people use that technology means that there is no roadmap for the 
intelligence community as to what is expected of them. The semi-public nature of cyberspace 
along with the difficulty of ascribing provenance once the information leaves the individual 
PHDQVWKDWWKHYHU\LGHDRIµSULYDF\¶RQWKH,QWHUQHWLVQRWFOHDU&KDQJHVLQVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ
LQF\EHUVSDFHKDYHUHVXOWHGLQDQLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQIXVHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµRQOLQHVSDFHV¶)RU
example, chat rooms, social media forums like Facebook and YouTube, and even web 
browsing distort established public/private distinctions by representing µSULYDWH-VRFLDO¶
spheres, acting to publically display and disseminate personal information to be seen by an 
increasingly large and varied audience. However, it is unclear how much people intend to 
waive their privacy or control and allow state access to this information. Furthermore, the 
collection of meta-data detailing online habits can betray personal insights into the individual, 
including political inclinations, state of health, sexuality, religious sentiments and a huge 
range of other personal characteristics, preoccupations and individual interests. Importantly, 
while this information does not necessarily have to be unique and can be pretty superficial ± 
from online chatting, looking at pictures and videos, to searching the minutiae of our 
everyday lives ± but can reveal what the individual might consider his personal life. Indeed, 
the UK Joint Committee oQWKH'UDIW&RPPXQLFDWLRQV'DWD%LOOQRWHGWKDWµweb logs are a 
type of communications data from which significant inferences could be drawn about a 
SHUVRQ¶V LQWHUHVWVDQGSHUKDSVDFWLYLWLHV¶DQGDVD UHVXOWDFFHVVLQJZHE ORJV LQ WKLVZD\ LV
likely to bH µat the more intrusive end of the communications data spectrum¶ -RLQW
Committee, 2013, §82 p.28). Furthermore, given that a lot of online activity is done within 
the protection of the home or through a personal computerised system of some form it can 
feel like a private communication ± much like a phone call between yourself and the website 
± meaning that the individual is likely to carry out his intimate life there. 
5 
When examining privacy in cyberspace, therefore, it is important to not think of it as a 
binary, whole one minute and destroyed the next. Rather, that different situations carry with 
them different expectations of privacy, established through social understandings or some 
performance used to denote a specific activity as possessing a particular level of privacy. For 
example, when an individual withdraws himself from society or actively shuts others out in 
some way ± locking something in a box or being secretive about something ± this can 
indicate a high level of expected privacy. Or, if it can be argued that those actions are widely 
considered to be personal or intimate (though not necessarily unique) there can be a higher 
expectation of protected privacy. On the flipside, however, is that an individual can, partially 
or fully, waive their privacy through their own (in)action. For example, if someone makes it 
hard for another to not overhear them or acts in such a way as to indicate a lack of care for 
their privacy then they waive some of the normal protections. 
The impact on privacy is not all, however, as the very act of monitoring people in 
their daily lives can represent a threat to their autonomy. The argument is that an individual 
will act differently if he thinks he is being watched as compared to when he thinks he is 
alone, conforming to the standards of what he thinks is expected of him by his watchers. He 
will imagine the watcher judging him and will alter his behaviour as a result. The fear, 
therefore, is that cyber-LQWHOOLJHQFH¶VDELOLW\WRWUDQVFHQGVSDFHDQGWLPHOLPLWDWLRQVEULQJs the 
asymmetric gaze of the panopticon to non-institutionalised spaces and can detrimentally 
DIIHFWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDXWRQRP\ as a result. (Foucault, 1979, pp.202-203; McCahill, 1998, pp. 
41-65).  
Moreover, how this data is used can also cause further problems. There are those that 
believe that through the use of facts like race, religion, gender and class it is possible to create 
predictive models. They argue that because of the relatively high correlation between 
personal attributes and behaviour it is a fairly cheap and easy way of understanding and 
predicting how an individual or a group will act (Hausman and McPhereson, 1996). By 
FROOHFWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ HQPDVVH WKHKRSH LVRQHRI µGLVFRYHULQJPHDQLQJIXOSDWWHUQV LQ WKH
GDWD¶ *DQG\  S LQ Rrder to build profiles of both people and events to create a 
YHULWDEOH µFU\VWDO EDOO¶ ZKLFK FDQ EH XVHG WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO DQG SUHGLFW KLV
intentions (Keefe, 2005, p.99).  
 
Levels of Harm  
Importantly, however, it is possible to consider these different cyber-intelligence activities as 
causing different levels of harm depending on the type of privacy they violate or the degree to 
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which they affect the inGLYLGXDO¶VDXWRQRP\%RWKVHUYHUORJV and personal web logs violate 
DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSULYDF\WKRXJKLWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWWKH\GRVRWRGLIIHUHQWH[WHQWV7KDWLV
collecting personal web logs LVDJUHDWHUYLRODWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSULYDF\WKDQDlooking at 
server logs because they collect more personal information of a greater quantity and quality. 
Server web logs will only really give a particular snapshot of what a group of individuals 
were looking at, WKHRQHµGDQJHURXV¶ZHEVLWHYLVLWHG is examined to see who visited it and so 
this singular bit of information would only be linked to the individual and nothing more at 
this stage. What this means is that it is not very revealing in regards to any particular 
individual, his identity and his personal activity. It is essentially breadth over depth. In 
comparison a personal web logs give a full detailed web browsing history for an individual 
making it more likely to reveal his intimate life and what he chooses to do when he thinks he 
is in private. Depth over breadth. It can be argued that the individual can expect a greater 
level of control over this information as it is reflecting a more intimate part of his life.  
 Moreover, both of these types of searches can be done to different extents. Data 
collection on personal conditions or sexual relations could be considered more private than an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDGGUHVV, telephone numbers and email accounts, but that this information is more 
private than superficial information that the individuals willingly transmits such as gender, 
age, height, weight and hair colour. Therefore, for data-mining the level of intrusion, and 
therefore harm, can be tied into the types of databases it accesses. Equally, dataveillance can 
vary according to whether it collects data on the general website the individual is visiting ± 
EHIRUHWKHµIRUZDUGVODVK¶in the URL ± or has a precise reading on what actual content the 
individual is looking at ± after the µIRUZDUGVODVK¶3 Similarly, when collecting digital data 
on activities carried out in the real world, identification and location can be considered less 
intimate than information that details activities carried out.  
 This means it is possible to delineate different levels of harm caused by cyber-
intelligence according to how intrusive the action is. From a superficial identification of an IP 
address at one end, moving through to a real identification, to superficial data-mining and 
dataveillance searches, to more intensive data searches, to accessing email and voice-call 
content at the other end. In response to these different levels, therefore, the justifying 
principles must be equally nuanced, where there is a correlation between the harm caused and 
the surrounding circumstances used to justify it. Quite simply, as the level of harm goes up so 
too should the Just Cyber-Intelligence Principles described below. 
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Just Cyber-Intelligence? 
As an ethical framework the just war tradition was designed to grapple with the notion that 
WKHUHDUHVRPHDFWVVXFKDVNLOOLQJVRPHRQHWKDWµLQWKHQRUPDOFRQWH[WDUHJUDYHO\ZURQJ¶
while understanding that in certain circumstances, war for example, these same acts cannot 
totally be dismissed, but play an important role in protecting both the political community 
and its people from a range of threats (Quinlan, 2007, p.2). The state must be able to act to 
protect those whose duty it is to care for. However, this does not allow unrestrained action 
and, as such, there is still a need to limit the damage that war can cause. As a result, what 
evolved over the centuries was a set of principles designed to govern and limit the activity of 
war and the harm it can cause, while maintaining the broader context of the duty of public 
DXWKRULWLHVWREHDEOHWRXVHYLROHQFHIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIRQH¶VVWDWHRUWKDWRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
peace and stability (Turner, 1981, p.xxi).  
The just war tradition is, therefore, well versed in reconciling the tension that is born 
from balancing the needs of the political community with the harm this can cause. That is, 
LQWHOOLJHQFH FDQ DOVR LQYROYH SUDFWLFHV WKDW µXQDYRLGDEO\ HQWDLO GRLQJ VRPH WKLQJV WKDW DUH
SODLQO\DQGVHULRXVO\FRQWUDU\WRWKHPRUDOUXOHVDFFHSWHGDVJRYHUQLQJPRVWKXPDQDFWLYLW\¶
(Quinlan, 2007, p.2) yet can be justified as an important means of protecting both people and 
the political community. It can be argued, therefore, that the ethical principles that underpin 
the just war tradition represent the most appropriate starting-point in designing an ethical 
cyber-intelligence framework. The principles developed here demand both a limitation on the 
harm that is caused by intelligence collection, while also outlining exactly when that harm is 
justified.  
One importance difference, however, between war and intelligence is that in the 
former there is a sharp distinction between the justice of going to war, jus ad bellum, and the 
justice of actions within war, jus in bello. This distinction does not work when we consider 
cyber-intelligence collection. There is not the same division between evaluating and 
sanctioning the general act of intelligence collection and the carrying out of the variety of 
acts under this authorisatiRQWKDWLVVHHQZLWKZDU7KHUHLVQRµWLPHRIZDUWLPHRISHDFH¶
distinction for intelligence, but rather operations are running continuously. So, with 
intelligence, the evaluation must be done continuously, whereby each operation must fulfil all 
the just cyber-intelligence principles described below, with an operation being sanctioned 
according to who is being targeted, taking into account whether there is a specific just cause 
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for the operation, ensuring that there is a right intention, and that the method chosen is 
proportionate the proposed gains.  
 
Just Cause 
7KHMXVWZDUSULQFLSOHRIµMXVWFDXVH¶LVRIWHQFRQVLGHUHGWREHRQHRILWVPRVWLPSRUWDQWDVLW
is this that gives the main justification for initiating the war (Orend, 2013, p.49). That is, 
µWKRVHZKRDUHDWWDFNHGPXVWEHDWWDFNHGEHFDXVHWKH\GHVHUYHLWRQDFFRXQWRIVRPHIDXOW¶
(Aquinas, 2004, p.214). The current accepted manifestation of a just cause is acting in self-
defence or the defence of others. This justification is often drawn from either the 
H[WUDSRODWLRQRIWKHµGRPHVWLFDQDORJ\¶- the ontological justification for wars of self-defence 
ZKHUHE\HWKLFDOIUDPHZRUNVGHVLJQHGIRUHYHU\GD\DFWLYLWLHVDUHH[WUDSRODWHGµXS¶RQWRWKH
state - or from the argument that the political community represents an ethical good in 
SHRSOHV¶ OLYHV DQG VR QHHGV SURWHFWLQJ 7KH HTXLYDOHQW MXVW FDXVH IRU F\EHU-intelligence is 
similar in that it relies on a notion of self-defence, whereby the protection of the political 
community is achieved through the detection and prevention of threats; essentially a pre-
emptive, or even preventive, act of self-defence.4 Importantly, as Walzer points out, we can 
imagine a spectrum of anticipation, with an imminent but anticipatory pre-emptive act of self-
defence at one end and a preventive act designed to forestall a distant danger at the other end 
(2000, p.75). The significant point is that depending on where the threat falls on this spectrum 
the level of harm caused that can be justified can change. That is, threats that are larger or 
more imminent represent a just cause for a greater level of harm than those threats that are 
distant or are only minimally threatening, though these distant threats might be a just cause 
for a low-level privacy violation. For cyber-intelligence, by examining the threatening nature 
of the website itself we can determine if there is just cause to, first, identify, locate or arrest 
those who made the website, and, second, identify, locate or arrest those who have visited it. 
 
Right Intention  
It is thought by just war theorists that it is not enough to have an objective just cause for war, 
but there must also be a proper subjective right intention. That is, the intention behind an act 
alters the moral quality of an act and, as such, represents an important part of how an act is 
judged (Thomson, 1986, p.101-102; Scanlon and Daney, 2000). The reasoning behind this is 
that it is very possible for µwar to be declared by legitimate authority and have just cause, yet 
nonetheless be made unlawful through a wicked intention¶ (Aquinas, 2002, p.214). The aims 
of the war must be consistent with the just cause invoked to justify the war; acting in self-
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defence cannot then be used in order to annihilate or subjugate another. This right intention is 
then determined by examining the actions deployed: if it is a war of self-defence the tactics 
employed must not be one of domination. In addition, the principle of right intention plays an 
important role in the doctrine of double effect, whereby actions with foreseen collateral 
damage can be permitted when the harm is not directly intended, nor is a means to achieving 
the good and proportionate end (Mangan, 1949, p.43). 
By drawing on this logic it can be argued that in order for intelligence collection to be 
morally permissible the intelligence collection activity should be used for the stated purpose 
and not other political, economic, or social objectives. The intention should be to deal with 
the threat posed directly rather than using the presence of a threat as an excuse for host of 
other operations. The means used, who is targeted, and how much harm is allowed, should all 
flow from the intended purpose of dealing with this particular threat.  
The principle of right intention, therefore, limits the type of information accessed, 
how it is stored and how it is shared. Firstly, there must be effort to only collect that 
information which is directly pertinent to the case at hand, which means using a collection 
method and picking a target most suited to gaining that intelligence. So in practice, when an 
application is made, through a warrant for example, the terms should reflect the just cause, 
and in turn the type of search carried out should reflect the intent behind that just cause.5 The 
investigating officer may only VHDUFK µSODFHV ZKLFK PLJKW UHDVRQDEO\ EH VXVSHFWHG RI
containing thHVSHFLILHGRIIHQGLQJDUWLFOHV¶6WRQHS If the officer was to search 
places outside the warrant, for example, then he is acting with an ulterior motive to the just 
cause and is therefore not working with the right intention (Feldman, 1986, p.171). Any 
information that is incidental to this threat and is not in itself threatening must be stopped and 
discarded. This is in-line with current law enforcement practices that dictate that when 
WDSSLQJDVXVSHFW¶VSKRQH WKHFDOO is marked either as pertinent or non-pertinent within the 
first 30 seconds and monitored accordingly. However, anything thrown-up incidental to the 
specified threat but is still inline with search parameters and is threatening in some other way 
may be seized since, even though the items found were not specified at the beginning, the 
type of search carried out itself was still in-line with the original intention. Just because the 
outcome does not match the original intention does not alter the fact that the officer was 
working with the correct intention in the first place. This would be analogous to finding 
illegal goods incidentally while performing a legal search. However, what is not permissible 
is to use a just cause such as tax fraud to justify the collection and retention of DNA, as this 
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type of information is unrelated and is not reflecting the original just cause, clearly outside 
what should be the correct intention. 
Furthermore, information should only be kept with a direct reason, meaning that 
without specified reasons retention times should be kept to a minimum.6 If information is 
collected, the justification for keeping that information must reflect the intention associated 
with the threat that supports the just cause. If a case is examined and the suspicion on which 
the search was based is not made real then the just cause for keeping the information withers. 
Any further retention of information comes with a different intention, with some broader aim 
RIFROOHFWLQJSHRSOH¶VLQIRUPDWLRQ for the sake of it, regardless of the proposed threat.  
 
Just Intelligence and Last Resort ± Temporal Proportionality  
In the just war tradition the principle of last resort is an attempt to allow those more benign 
means of responding to a crisis, such as diplomacy or economic pressure, a chance to resolve 
the issue before the resort to organised violence is permitted. If possible more harmful acts 
VKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHDYRLGHG+RZHYHU5REHUW3KLOOLSVZDUQVWKDWµLWLVDPLVWDNHWRVXSSRVH
WKDWµODVW¶QHFHVVDULO\GHVLJQDWHVWKHILQDOPRYHLQDFKURQRORJLFDOVHULHVRIDFWLRQV¶ (Philips, 
1984, p.14). If this were the case then force would never be legitimised as one could always 
QHJRWLDWHIXUWKHU ,QVWHDGZKDWLWGHPDQGVLVWKDWDFWRUVµFDUHIXOO\HYDOXDWHDOOWKHGLIIHUHQW
strategies that might bring about the desired end, selecting force as it appears to be the only 
IHDVLEOHVWUDWHJ\IRUVHFXULQJWKRVHHQGV¶ (Bellemy, 2006, p.123). 
What this means for cyber-intelligence is that any operation should use the least 
harmful activity first thus giving the opportunity for more harmful activities to be avoided. 
While there are no rigid steps that must be worked through, it does require that some of the 
more harmful actions are not resorted to out of ease, expediency or preference.  
Moreover, by understanding the principle of last resort in this way it resolves an 
important difference between intelligence and war. Namely, the temporal paradox justifying 
cyber-intelligence poses. That is, given that it is the duty of intelligence agencies to provide 
the very information that is then used to establish whether the action is justified, it is difficult 
to make these initial ethical calculation with no information provided. However, by 
imagining justification as a spectrum one can consider those actions that cause minimal harm 
to those targeted as only needing a suspicion of a threat to act as a just cause; whereas more 
intrusive activities must have a greater level of evidence to justify the action, solid 
information on a large threat for example. This spectrum is itself nothing new. Various legal 
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V\VWHPV PDUN RXW OHYHOV RI HYLGHQFH RU µEXUGHQV RI SURRI¶ ZKLFK DUH UHTXLUHG ZKHQ
assessing whether certain actions are permissible or not. Legal canons mark a distinction 
between a reasonable suspicion, a probable cause, a balance of probabilities, clear evidence, 
and beyond any reasonable doubt, whereby depending on the circumstances the level of 
proof required changes. For example, reasonable suspicion is a low standard of proof often 
required to determine whether a brief investigative stop or search by a police officer or any 
JRYHUQPHQWDJHQWLVZDUUDQWHG)RUDQ\WKLQJWKDWLVPRUHµLQWUXVLYH¶WRGHWDLn someone for 
example, a higher burden of proof must be provided, for instance a probable cause. These 
different levels of probability provide, what Polyvious Polyviou calls, the µbest compromise¶ 
between two often opposing interests, µthe intrusions upon the individual and the security of 
the state¶ (Polyviou, 1982, p.97). This notion is easily compatible with intelligence collection. 
Intelligence is essentially a calculation of probabilities and possibilities about activities that it 
is not meant to know about. Intelligence by its very nature is engaged with uncertainties: 
µintelligence rarely tells you all you want to know. Often difficult decisions need to be made 
on the basis of intelligence which is fragmentary and difficult to interpret¶ (Parkinson and 
Walker, 2009, p.95). Intelligence operatives must engage with what evidence they have and 
determine what action is best given the range of possibilities. If the information collected 
proves fruitful then it can be used as further justification of those activities that are 
increasingly intrusive. 
 
Proportionality 
One can argue that in order for the cyber-intelligence to be just the level of harm that one 
SHUFHLYHVWREHFDXVHGE\WKHFROOHFWLRQVKRXOGEHRXWZHLJKHGE\WKHSHUFHLYHGJDLQVµLVWKH
likely impact of the proposed intelligence gathering operation, taking account of the methods 
to be used, in proportion to the seriousness of the business at hand in terms of the harm it 
VHHNVWRSUHYHQW"¶Omand, 2007, p.162). However, it is only those goods that are related to 
the just cause that should be counted as a positive, while almost all damages caused should be 
LQFOXGHGDVDQHJDWLYH7KRPDV+XUNDDVNVXVWRLPDJLQHDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHµRXUQDWLRQKDVD
just cause for war but is also in economic recession, and that fighting the war would lift both 
our and the world economiHV RXW RI WKLV UHFHVVLRQ¶ (Hurka, 2005, p.40). Although the 
economic benefits here are very real, these cannot be counted towards the proportionality 
calculation. We cannot justify killing in terms of the economic gains that it might produce. In 
contrast to this, however, while only certain goods may be counted in favour of acting, all 
GDPDJHVRUKDUPVPXVWEHFRXQWHG5HWXUQLQJ WR+XUND¶VH[DPSOHZKLOH WKHERRVW WR WKH
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economy cannot be counted as a relevant good, the fact that it might hurt the economy could 
be counted as a negative.  
 As such, in order to satisfy the principle of proportionality there must be a calculation 
of the overall damage caused, not just to the individual targeted or from this specific 
operations, but other, wider social harms caused as well. For example, damage to social 
cohesion, degradation of trust between social groups, aggregation of minor harms into larger 
harms and the potential for radicalisation should all be taken into account. 
 
Discrimination  
The requirement that an attack must discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets 
is one of the most stridently codified just war rules and is reflected in the international law of 
war as such (Geneva 1949; 1977, Article 51 §2). Soldiers charged with the deployment of 
force and violence cannot do so indiscriminately. They have an obligation to exert a 
particular effort to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. That is, the target 
has to have µVRPHWKLQg about WKHP¶ to justify being targeted (Nagel, 1979, p.124). Just as 
soldiers are legitimate targets because they are a threat or because they have acted in a way so 
as to waive protective rights, arguably any individual can act in a way so as to forfeit their 
protective rights. Moreover, revisionist just war theorists make the case that this µVRPHWKLQJ¶ 
does not necessarily have to be based on how directly threatening the individual is, nor 
should we rely on a simple distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Jeff 
McMahan argues that instead of defining innocence in terms of guilt, innocence should be the 
absence of moral responsibility (McMahan, 2009, p.32-34). That, µFLYLOLDQV can be related to 
unjust combatants [...]. They can be instigators of unjust wars, or aiders and abettors who 
share responsibility for unjust acts of war perpetrated by unjust FRPEDWDQWV¶ (McMahan, 
2009, p.208). Discrimination conceived in this way rests on the degree of responsibility (and 
resulting liability) of the individual. Individuals can become morally responsible for a war 
when they intentionally work to stimulate popular support (publications, public speeches, 
lobbying, etc.) or support the fighting unintentionally through their employment (McMahan, 
2009, p.214-15). Gerhard Øverland makes a similar argument that µQRn-threatening people 
may or may not be morally responsible for the existence of threats and DJJUHVVRUV¶ arguing 
that a person can give rise to the materialisation of a threat and so are, through their 
contribution, a legitimate target (2005, p.349). Importantly, while McMahan argues that 
µPRVW unjust civilians are at most responsible to a low degree for their FRXQWU\¶V unjust ZDU¶ 
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and so are µDOPRVW never liable to intentional military DWWDFN¶ this does not preclude other, 
less harmful actions, such as intelligence (2009, p.231). Strawser, for example, argues that 
depending on the level of liability the individual represents the response accorded to them can 
change: µGLVWLQFWLRQV could range from 1st, 2nd and 3rd- degree combatants and the like (or 
more, as needed) and similar degrees for QRQFRPEDWDQWV¶ where µWKRVH labeled as simply 
µcombatants¶ would instead be considered some lesser-degreed type of combatants with 
different correlative ROE [Rules of Engagement]. Similarly, the same would be done for 
those traditionally labeled as simply µnoncombatants¶¶ (2013, p.79-80). 
Depending on what level of responsibility or culpability to the threat the individual 
represents the type of activity to which they are a legitimate target changes. For cyber-
intelligence, by holding a particular job, being in possession of important information, being 
a member of a VWDWH¶V infrastructure, accessing a particular webpage, logistical or contributing 
support to the threat, are all examples of how individuals contribute to varying degrees to the 
threat and make themselves legitimate targets to an equal level.  
 
Cases: Targeted Cyber-Intelligence Vs. En Masse Collection 
The development of the Internet as one the biggest mediums through which individuals can 
access and disseminate information means that anyone who has an Internet connection has 
access to a truly massive (and potentially dangerous) amount of information. The intelligence 
community is therefore undoubtedly keen to locate both those websites that hold and 
disseminate dangerous information as well as track those who seek to use that information to 
cause others harm. µ7DUJHWHG cyber-intelligence¶ involves focusing on a small set of 
individuals or websites, examining them to determine whether they represent a threat in 
themselves or if they will instigate, promote or facilitate dangerous activity by those who 
visit them. Important ethical questions therefore revolve around what website is targeted, who 
is investigated as a result and how in-depth the investigation becomes. Whereas µen masse 
collection¶ gathers as much information as possible from all data sources, continually 
collecting and storing the information ready for later exploration and analysis. This 
introduces important questions regarding the type of information collected, how long it is 
retained and what role predictive models or profiles should play in the investigation.  
 
Case 1: Dangerous Websites, Dangerous People   
In the first case the type of websites targeted are those that are engaging in violent, harmful or 
destructive activities themselves. This might include, for example, websites being used to 
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organize, plan or carry out an act of terrorism or to recruit and train potential terrorists. It has 
become increasingly apparent that on the operational side of terrorism the Internet can play a 
pivotal role in communicating information to those concerned, either directly through web 
chats and emails or indirectly through hiding information in otherwise seemingly harmless 
stenography. Or equally powerful, as a tool to µGHYHORS relationships with, and solicit 
VXSSRUW« as a means of clandestine UHFUXLWPHQW¶ (Gerwehr and Daly, 2006, p.83; Denning, 
2010). What this means is that the website itself represents a threat as a key facilitator of the 
end goal and can be used to link those individuals who make up that threat. So, as long as 
there is enough evidence to demonstrate that the website or web account is being used to plan 
and organise terrorist acts, there is a just cause to explore both those who created it and visit 
the site.  
For proportionality, searches that have a targeted individual or website in mind, the 
harm caused is mostly localised to those few directly involved and given that there is often a 
clear benefit ± including preventing a terrorist operation, fraud or sexual abuse ± it is easy to 
determine if the harm is offset by the information gained.  
Equally, with targeted searches there is the occasion to highlight, evaluate and 
determine whether those examined are legitimate targets. It is not too difficult to discern 
those individuals who manufacture, maintain or use the website to facilitate the threat. 
However, in order for the visitors to be linked to the conspiracy they must be connected 
through one overt act to show complicity in the threat. 7  Complicity might include a 
relationship that provides either intellectual or direct logistical support, often demonstrated by 
the transference of money and/oU JRRGV PXWXDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ RQ D PHPEHU¶V RQO\
password-protected site, or other actions that reflect the intent to cause others harm. This 
would also include knowing about the threat and not acting to prevent it. Luckily, 
determining contributors for these types of websites can be relatively easy. Their closed 
nature means that participation can be demonstrated through signing up and using passwords 
to gain access, contributing to the organisation of the threat, or sanctioning or encouraging an 
operation through dialogue. Each of these requires an exerted effort by the visitor, marking 
their contributing to part of the threat.  
 A recent case from France, Public Prosecutor v. Hicheur, illustrated how different 
forms of online technology can be used to facilitate the preparation of acts of terrorism by 
disseminating information and plans through password-protected websites.8 Adlène Hicheur, 
a nuclear physicists, had translated, encrypted, compressed and password-protected pro-
jihadist materials, including documents and videos, which he then uploaded and circulated 
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YLDWKH,QWHUQHWGLVWULEXWHGWKHHQFU\SWLRQVRIWZDUHµ0XMDKHGHHQ6HFUHWV¶WRIDFLOLWDWHFRYHUW
Internet communications; conspired with an AQIM member to organize and coordinate pro-
jihadist activities, including, but not limited to, providing financial support to the jihadist 
cause, disseminating pro-jihadist information and supporting the creation of an operational 
unit in Europe, and in particular in France, to potentially prepare terrorist attacks; acted as 
moderator on the pro-jihadist Ribaat website; and took concrete steps to provide financial 
support to AQIM, including through the attempted use of PayPal and other virtual payment 
systems (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, p.9). These actions mark all those 
involved in the digital interaction as clear conspirators in the larger plan, complicit in the 
threat and so there is a just cause to use intrusive cyber-intelligence activities to locate and 
detain those involved.  
For the intelligence operative this means they are justified in carrying out in-depth 
data-mining and dataveillance operations, accessing both server web logs and personal web 
logs to locate those involved digitally as well as in the real world. This can also include using 
some of the more intrusive forms of information collection such as accessing their email and 
voice-call content and accessing personal databases ± medical, financial and tracking them 
through their real world electronic footprint. What is clear is that if these actions were 
performed in the real world ± engagement, knowledge, logistical or contributory support, 
training or planning of a terrorist operation for example ± these individuals would represent a 
legitimate target.  
 
Case 2: Promoting and Listening to Violent Speech 
A different case might be where the website is seen to be dangerous or threating, but does not 
necessarily mean that those who visit it are participating in the threat itself. For instance, 
websites that advocate, foster or encourage the use of violence. In the case of terrorism this 
means messages designed to incite violent activity (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2012, p.6). However, in order to protect the important freedom of expression while 
still defending the wider political community, a distinction must be made between 
propaganda and materials intended to incite acts of terrorism, where the latter has the intent to 
directly promote violence through the development and realisation of some terrorist plot 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution, 1979). 
For example, three Islamist extremists who were jailed for engaging in a µF\EHU-MLKDG¶ where 
they µSURPRWHG martyrdom and holy war through online forums and websites, including 
discussions about a plot by 45 doctors to explode a car bomb at an American naval EDVH¶ with 
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the aim of inciting terrorism through the Internet (Woolcock, 2007). They were supporting 
and conveying a message of violence in order to encourage others to join and so the video 
itself represents a just cause to locate those who are behind it and its efforts. In this case, 
those who created the website have acted to contribute to the threat through their promoting, 
encouraging and sanctioning, and even possible recruitment, of the threat itself.  This level of 
threat and involvement offers a just cause to locate the creators in the real world as well as 
some detailed cyber-investigation, including accessing emails, a search of other online 
activities and a search of personal data databases.  
The difference between this and last case is that those who visit the website are not 
necessarily engaging in the threatening act. This means that there is only a just cause for 
identification of the individual, keeping a record and flagging the individual as possibly 
dangerous for a determined amount of time, cross-referencing their details with other security 
databases, and a superficial check on their web activity. This superficial check means limiting 
the data collected to the overall title of the website, so anything before the first forward-slash 
(/). Without any further evidence they cannot have their detailed weblogs seized or their lives 
interfered with, as this causes wider harms for which there is no just cause. For example, 
those visiting the cyber-jihad YouTube sites cannot be detained and questioned in the real 
world. This is because while it can be argued that visiting threatening websites represents the 
possibility of them becoming threatening, their presence is not in itself enough to contribute 
to the threat sufficiently, and is also only a suspicion rather than being an actual threat. If, 
from the other online searches, it turns out they have being promoting violence themselves or 
contributing to a threat elsewhere, then they can be detained; if not then they must be left 
alone.  
 
Case 3: Dangerous Information and Curiosity  
A third case, similar to the previous but with important differences, is a site that has 
information which itself is not problematic, though has the potential to being used in a 
dangerous way. For example, a webpage detailing the mechanics behind making a bomb. In 
itself the webpage is not advocating harm though when read and used by someone with ill 
intent has the potential to be very dangerous. In this situation the webpage itself does not 
represent a direct threat. This means that those who maintain the website can be identified, 
but if it appears that they are unthreatening and there is an understandable reason for having 
the information (a chemistry teacher for example) the record should be deleted. They cannot 
be tracked down in real life, detained or have their personal information stores examined 
17 
without further evidence that they wish to use this information for harm or are encouraging 
others to use this information to cause others harm. The website itself can be monitored and 
non-identifying information (IP addresses for example) can be stored for a short time and 
cross-referenced to determine if they are visiting any other web pages or distributing the 
information, which might indicate an increased level of threat. If no further evidence comes 
to light then the data must be deleted.  
 However, those who visit the website should not be directly identified nor are they 
legitimate targets for intrusive actions. Curiosity in information is not a sufficient just cause. 
A notable example is the Masters student researching terrorist tactics who was arrested and 
detained for six days after Nottingham University informed police about the al-Qaida-related 
material he downloaded (Curtis and Hodgson, 2013). The data itself was not harmful nor was 
it likely to be harmful when visited by those with benign intent. There was also a reasonable 
explanation for the information collection. There should have been no identification of the 
individual made, nor should the student have been detained. Therefore, unless there is some 
communication that contains information specifying that the material is shared for the 
furtherance of a terrorist purpose, websites such as these that are simply informative.  
 
Case 4: En Masse Data Collection  
In comparison to the above cases that target small groups of people or a selection of websites, 
using en masse collection methods to access and search large databases such as those held by 
Google or ISPs and using pattern-based analysis to locate potential threats does not and could 
not have a just cause. Due to its en masse and ubiquitous nature, the searches are carried out 
regardless of any particular threat present. Randomly searching information stores with the 
hope of finding a threat, means that for the majority of the time no specific threat exists. Even 
if the intelligence agency only searched particular µGDQJHURXV¶ terms, the threatening nature 
of the terms is too ephemeral, indistinct and open to mistake to act as a sufficient just cause 
for the harm it causes. What this shows is that, importantly, the general threat of terrorism, 
the so-called War on Terror for example, is too indistinct to offer any specific just cause for 
an operation; there must be a known threat of some form to justify the use of such cyber 
practices.  
Similarly, proportionality becomes of increased importance when examining en masse 
collection as it is at this stage that wider or cumulative harms are included in the ethical 
FDOFXODWLRQ ,W FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW VLPSO\ KDYLQJ RQH¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ D GDWDEDVH LV QRW
necessarily harmful. No specific individual is actually, directly examined. The information 
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exists in some database far away. Moreover, when the information is examined it is by some 
computerised system, rather than a human.  
 However, this position is problematic. It was argued earlier that accessing personal 
web logs is more harmful than accessing server logs because the former gave a more detailed 
in-GHSWKORRNLQWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHrsonal life, while the latter is a shallow look but for more 
individuals. This argument, however, was in regards to targeted operations that only included 
a select number of targets. However the limits of the position are shown here in that even if 
the monitoring is superficial, when carried out over a large group of individuals ± whether 
across all of society or in regards to a particular sub-set of society ± the large scale can cause 
wider harms.  
 It is first disproportionate because of the aggregation problem. The interest the 
individual has in their privacy has an intrinsic value and damaging it can cause harm 
regardless of the repercussions. 9  That is, even if, on balance, the individual does not 
H[SHULHQFH WKH KDUP LQ D µWDQJLEOH DQG PDWHULDO¶ ZD\ KH LV VWLOO KDUPHG VLQFH KLV YLWDO
interests have been violated or wronged (Feinberg, 1984, p.35). So, while the individual 
might not necessarily µfeel¶ the direct impact of the violation, he indeed still harmed, even 
though it could be argued minimally. However, when such harms aggregate over large groups 
of people it can be argued that the level of harm is greater than the vague and unquantified 
gains of potentially finding a threat at some point.  
In addition to violating our privacy these en masse collection methods can also 
represent a threat to our autonomy. Regardless of whether people are actually directly 
targeted, when dealing with such activities it is the perception that becomes important. En 
masse collection creates the implicit understanding that the Internet is being watched for 
security purposes and even though individuals are not likely to be singled out, the perception 
that they are being watched is still present and so acts as a force on their decision-making 
processes.  
 Importantly, this effect can be more readily felt by those sections of society that are 
highlighted as risk groups, suspect communities or consider themselves to be particularly 
marginalised. For example, while there was an official rhetoric by the Bush Administration 
during the 1990s and up to 9/11 terrorist attacks that profiling towards African-Americans 
and Hispanics was damaging and should be eliminated as a police practice, David Harris 
notes that after 9/11 attitudes in America have shifted in favour of ethic profiling in the 
context of searches against Arabs, Muslims and other Middle Easterners, showing how 
political and social trends can manifest VRWKDWFHUWDLQJURXSVDUHPDUNHGDVµDWULVN¶DQGKRZ
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this superficial data still plays a role in the surveillance of individuals (2002, pp.36-37). 
These groups are more likely to feel the adverse affects of en masse surveillance, perceiving 
their social group as being separate them from the rest of society, marking them as deviant in 
some way. This can cause wider problems, as profiled individuals are µQHFHVVDULO\ ODEHOOHG
and henceforth seen as a member of a group the peculiar features of which are assumed to 
FRQVWLWXWHSHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶6LPLWLVS,QGLYLGXDOVDUHWUHDWHGDFFRUGLQJWR
the perception of the group rather than their actions, closing options to the individual or 
causing self-fulfilling prophecies as individuals act according to these expectations. (Merton, 
1968, p.477). This only serves to erode the important bonds of trust within a society between 
the individual and the state, that social group and the state and even between different social 
groups. (Misztal, 1996, p.12; also see Hardin, 2002, p.3; Hertzberg, 1988, p.307-322). In 
sum, the fear is that these activities create feelings of marginalisation, exclusion and the 
potential for radicalisation (See Gandy, 2003; Kennedy, 1997; Lever, 2005; and Robinson, 
2000).  
 In practice, the databases created end up over-representing particular social groups, 
heightening social fear of that group as well as reinforcing distorted criminal statistics. For 
example, a report by the Equalities and Human Right Commission (EHRC) notes that µby our 
own calculation... in excess of 30% of all black males are on the National DNA Database 
(NDNAD), compared with only 10% white males and 10% Asian males¶ (Bennetto , 2009, 
p.5). The taint of suspicion lingers and can then lead to either inappropriate treatment later in 
life or can even spread like a stain across their associated, and overrepresented, group. The 
EHRC commented, µWe are concerned that the high proportion of black males recorded on 
the database is creating an impression that a singlHUDFLDOJURXSUHSUHVHQWVDQµDOLHQZHGJH¶RI
criminality¶ (Bennetto , 2009, p.39-40). Such overrepresentation of a particular group can 
come with a loss of trust and confidence in the state apparatus that can lead to a decrease in 
the willingness of people in communities perceived as victimised to cooperate. 
Such implicit and explicit forms of social control where the state strictly outlines what 
it thinks to be dangerous, unwanted or even deviant behaviour raises concerns regarding the 
state using its power to set social norms, meaning that those who fall outside those norms 
either alter their behaviour or face become increasingly marginalised. Arguably, broader 
harms means such as these activities become disproportional given the lack of direct or solid 
gains. 
Importantly, however, the principle of intention plays an important part in the 
discussion on these wider harms at this stage. It can be argued that these wider harms are not 
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actually intended, and unfair comparisons to the Stasi ± who used en masse collection 
methods in order to maintain control ± overshadow that there is not the same intention to 
exert social control with NSA¶V cyber-intelligence collection methods. This argument is 
essentially one of double effect: that while the additional harms are foreseen they are not 
intended nor are they actually required for the good ends. However, again proportionality 
forms an important part of this discussion, in that while it might not be the direct intention to 
exert social control over the populous, it is foreseeably disproportionate.  
Finally, with these en masse or pattern-based investigations they are essentially, by 
their very nature, unable to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets and so are 
prohibited. They target everyone in the hope of finding a threat from within the masses, 
meaning that much of the time they are targeting individuals who have not done anything to 
mark themselves as a threat or acted in a way to make them a legitimate target.  
 
Conclusion 
The computer revolution is seemingly a sword with many edges. The benefit it offers people 
in terms of making everyday lives more efficient and enjoyable comes with the cost of the 
help it offers those who would seek to cause harm. More importantly, however, is that this 
paper has argued that it can be the very fight to stop these threats by the intelligence 
community that in turn can cause harm to the very people it is designed to protect. Moreover, 
this paper has also claimed that there is an ethical argument to be made that this harm can be 
justified in reference to the ethical good found within the political community. Privacy and 
DXWRQRP\ UHSUHVHQW YLWDO LQWHUHVWV LQ HYHU\RQH¶V OLYHs and so any interference should be 
robustly justified. The problem is that the Internet is constantly evolving, and with it so 
evolves the way that people use it to interact with each other. There are no real clear rules for 
what should be expected from the intelligence community because there are no clear 
understandings regarding what sort of space or even activity it represents. The aim of this 
paper was to establish that intelligence collection does indeed cause harm which needs 
limiting, but that sometimes this harm is necessary in order to protect those for whom a 
political community carries responsibility. It is only by understanding this dual quality found 
within cyber-intelligence and balancing the concerns in relation to each other that we can 
then develop an appropriate set of guidelines in order to prevent undue harm to both the 
individual and the rest of society. 
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1
 Jenkins (2013) explores the boundaries between cyberspace and the physical realm, and argues that even 
though these might include software they are very much the same as any physical attack. This means not that 
they should be held to the same legal restrictions as any physical attack. Similarly, even though intelligence 
covert operations or counterintelligence attacks can be carried out in cyberspace, their impact is very much in 
the physical realm as so should be examined under equal terms. 
2
 Dipert (2013) examines the different cyber domains arguing that it is not restricted simply to the Internet and 
includes other factors, referred to as Other-Than-Internet or OTI attacks. Dipert discusses on other technologies 
such as GPS and thumb drives, with the latter being a key part of the Stuxnet attack, using networks but do not 
necessarily use the Internet.  
3
 7KLVW\SHRIWHUPLQRORJ\ZDVUHIOHFWHGLQWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶V'UDIW&RPPXQLFDWLRQ'DWD%LOO, §77 
p.26µSo the fact that a person visited www.nhs.uk is communications data and could form part of a web log, 
but it would not be permissible to record the fact that a person visited www.nhs.uk/conditions/depression¶. 
4
 This conception of just cause moves away from its traditional war based understanding in order to update it for 
intelligence. However, Eberle (2013) discusses µMXVW FDXVH¶ in relation to the emergence of cyber µDWWDFNV¶ 
framing it more inline with military responses. 
5
 µ$ search under a warrant may only be a search to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant 
was LVVXHG¶ UK Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 § 16(8). 
6
 The maximum length of time to which information collected can be kept collection under this type of example 
is set by the European Court council through the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Data 
Retention Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2006/24/EC March 15, 2006). 
7
 Section 5(3) Criminal Law Act 1977 preserved the common law offence of conspiracy tending to corrupt 
public morals or outrages public decency.  
8
 Judgement of 4 May 2012 Case No.0926639036 of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (14th Chamber/2), 
Paris.  
9
 Feinberg (1984, p.37) calls these requirements µZHOIDUH LQWHUHVWV¶ and John Rawls (1971, p.62) calls them 
µSULPDU\ JRRGV¶ but essentially they both amount to the same thing, that is, regardless of what conception of the 
good life the individual holds or what his life plans might be in detail, these preconditions must be satisfied first 
in order to achieve them. If these vital interests fall below a threshold level, the ability to realise the more 
ultimate needs, goals or activities can become dramatically hindered. In this way, these interests are the most 
important interests a person has, and thus cry out for protection.  
